This week the West of England Partnership submitted its £48 million Temple Meads to Ashton Vale Bus Rapid Transit route bid to central government for funding. (Read the press release here)
On "major projects" such as this central government will provide up to 90% of the funding from the Regional Funding Allocation if it approves the scheme. The remaining 10% (£4.8 million) has to be funded locally. If approved construction could begin in 2011.
Many people will be disappointed that the system is based on buses rather than being some sort of rail based system. However, when you look at the reports and other information on which decisions have been made it becomes more obvious that planners had little choice in the matter.
Central government has a large influence over what types of schemes will be built because they are providing the bulk of the funding. Current government policy significantly favours bus rapid transit over rail based rapid transit. Recent light rail projects have had spiralling costs and two have been cancelled by central government due to cost overruns.
The government will only fund 75% of rail based schemes but will fund 90% of bus based schemes. Since rail schemes cost more in the first place, the local funding burden for rail based schemes is significantly higher.
The Temple Meads to Ashton Vale route is only the first of ten or eleven planned rapid transit routes so this cost differential multiplied by ten becomes a real problem when trying to build the larger transport network.
Although it is acknowledged that people prefer rail based transport and that it does encourage more people out of their cars and into public transport, bus based rapid transit can deliver most of the real benefits of a rapid transit system. Since the option is to have a bus based system or no system, the bus based system should be welcomed.

Cycling and walking will also benefit from the BRT
There are significant differences between normal buses and a rapid transit system based on buses. This has to do with the supporting infrastructure. Because the system is segregated from or has priority over other traffic it is more reliable. The stops, ticketing systems and real time information all become more like a rail system. Turn up and go service frequencies make them convenient. And because rapid transit systems are well defined and simple they are easier to understand and use than normal bus networks.
The key to a successful uptake of the bus rapid transit system will be how it is priced.
The remainder of this article goes to some of the source documents used to form policy including the technical evaluations to shed light on the real facts. This article aims to be as neutral as possible recognising this is a controversial area. Although this is quite a long article this is a big subject and much is not covered. There are links to other web pages so you can read more on the subject.
It makes sense to just summarise what sort of transport systems exist to get a sense of which are applicable to the Bristol situation.
The London Underground is a mass transit system and can move between 25,000 - 45,000 passengers per hour per direction. Systems like this rely on high population densities, high capacity vehicles, and high demand single corridor routes in order to be cost effective. They can cost over 100 million per kilometre. This sort of system is clearly not appropriate for Bristol.
Normal trains at Bristol Temple Meads, Bristol Parkway, and on the Severn Beach line are heavy rail. Bristol has a number of existing stations and lines. It also has stations and lines that are disused or used for freight only. Plans are being investigated to open up more of these lines to increased passenger services. Heavy rail lines can carry 10,000 to 30,000 passengers per hour per direction. Making better use of this infrastructure and upgrading it is a key part of transport for Bristol but is not part of a rapid transport system as such.
Light rail or trams are rail based systems and are usually powered by overhead electricity lines. The vehicles are smaller than trains and their construction is significantly lighter than that of heavy rail. They are usually low floor vehicles which do not require platforms for boarding. Although the terms are fairly interchangeable, trams are generally thought to operate on rails within the road network, while light rail operates primarily aligned with the rail network. In reality most networks tend to have a mixture and the terms become equivalent.
Even though light rail vehicles may use the same gauge track as heavy rail, they cannot use the same tracks as heavy rail for safety reasons. Because of the weight, height and construction differences a light rail vehicle would be completely crushed by a normal train in a collision. There are also problems with vehicle speeds and communications which would make it problematic to run both light rail and heavy rail vehicles on the same tracks. However light rail can run on disused heavy rail tracks or on tracks parallel to current heavy rail tracks.
There are eight tram systems in the UK : Nottinghame Express Transit, Sheffield's Supertram, Manchester’s Metrolink, Midland Metro, Docklands Light Railway (DLR), Croydon Tramlink, Blackpool trams and the Tyne and Wear Metro. These systems were all added at different times and have different vehicles and characteristics.

Tramtrains are bigger and heavier than normal trams
Tramtrains are, as the name suggests, a combination of trams and trains which attempts to get the best of both worlds. These are larger than normal trams and can operate on heavy rail tracks concurrently with heavy rail traffic as well as on lighter rail infrastructure.
Although the concept has been around for about twelve years, there are only a few places actually using the technology. In the UK the Tyne and Wear extension to Sunderland uses this concept and there is to be a trial of tramtrains on the Huddersfield and Sheffield line in 2012.
The key benefit of tramtrain is that it allows routes to use heavy rail to extend the commuting catchment area and at the same time get to destinations in the very centre of cities without requiring passengers to change trains.
The two key disadvantages of this system are that it is expensive and works best where there is existing rail and tram rail infrastructure that can be linked. So it is more of an "upgrade" technology for cities that already have a high tram and train usage.
Currently these would not appear to be a good choice for Bristol.
One of the costs of a tram system is the overhead electrification. Another cost is research and development of vehicles for a relatively small market. The concept for Ultra Light Rail is lighter weight, lower capacity vehicles on lower cost rail infrastructure or to put it crudely to put buses onto rails.

Concept vehicle
By making the vehicles run on some kind of stored energy (i.e. a petrol, diesel, or LPG) the cost of constructing routes can be reduced. By using parts and engines from other types of vehicles the development, purchase and maintenance costs can be reduced.
Between 1998 and 2000 there was a prototype of an ultra light rail vehicle on the Bristol Harbourside. There was also a test vehicle at Stroubridge which was evaluated as part of the research to find appropriate systems for a Bristol solution.
Ultra light rail has many attractive qualities. However it is a new idea and it is not being used in any other cities yet. The infrastructure costs for the rails may be slightly cheaper because they will not need overhead electrification but could easily be comparable to the costs of a light rail system. This adds risk to any bid for funding and would make any scheme less likely to receive approval from central government.
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) uses modern buses and a variety of physical measures in conjunction with operational and system elements such as a segregated lanes/routes, improved stop infrastructure, on-street priority, real time information and high frequency services.
The advantage of BRT are that it is cheaper to implement and operate than rail based systems. The disadvantage is usually lower public uptake.
The West of England Partnership has commissioned reports by Steer Davies Gleave to evaluate the options. Figures in this section will be drawn from those reports and cross checked as far as possible.
Although the report spends quite a lot of time discussing tramtrains, it is fairly clear that they are not really in the running. Mass transit (like the Londond Underground) is not appropriate and heavy rail is a slightly separate issue.
The real contest is between light rail (trams), ultra light rail and bus rapid transit. In a way these represent a continuum in that ultra light rail uses rails like light rail but is based on vehicles that have more in common with buses. It is also safe to assume that the costs of light rail will be the highest, ultra light rail in the middle and buses will be the cheapest.
One reason often suggested as an advantage of rail based systems is the rolling efficiency of metal wheels on metal tracks (rather than rubber wheels on asphalt roads). Once a train is up to speed the amount of energy needed to keep it at that speed is lower than for vehicles with rubber wheels.
However there are two factors which largely negate this benefit on a rapid transit system. The first is that because distance between stops is short, the vehicle spends very little time coasting at constant speed and spends most of the time accelerating and decelerating.
The other factor is that vehicles running on metal wheels are heavier than those running on rubber tyres and this reduces the difference in efficiency even when coasting at a constant speed and it takes more energy to accelerate and decelerate a heavier vehicle.
Rail based transport is still more efficient, but not as much as the raw rolling resistance coefficients would suggest. The absolute efficiency of the vehicle is also less important than the fact that a rapid transit system will reduce the number of cars which will deliver a greater environmental benefit.
Sewage, water, gas, electricity and telecoms utilities run under most city streets. When tram lines are installed, these utilities have to be moved so that they are not under the lines themselves or the sweep paths of the vehicles.
If they were left under the lines, then the rapid transit system would not be useable during the weeks or months when the tracks were dug up to access utilities below. It is very difficult or impossible to set up temporary tracks during works. There are apparently no known places where utilities have been left below tram lines in the UK.
Moving utilities accounts for a fifth of the cost of installing tram lines on city streets.
In the technology review report , table 4.8 sets out a cost breakdown for a road based light rail system both as a percentage and in millions of pounds based on an average cost of £12 million per kilometre.

Traction power means the overhead power lines for the tram. Utilities is the cost of moving gas, electric, phone etc. lines. The other categories are fairly self explanatory.
The report then looks at the cost of building the initial rapid transit route that would orbit the city centre connecting Bristol Temple Meads with the Long Ashton park and ride. The estimates all assume a target capacity of 3000 passengers per hour and factor in enough vehicles to cover this capacity. The total route is 7.2 km long with 2.7 km segregated (away from roads) and 4.5 km on existing roads. Building rails on roads is more expensive than rails off roads.
The ultra light rail vehicles would cost a total of £12.3 million. The company that would make them, Sustranco , says it costs £3.6 million per kilometre to install track. The report consultants argue that this figure is for the track only and does not include the cost of moving the utilities, building the stops, adding signalling and communications.
This means the vehicle company estimates a cost of £38 million whereas the consultants estimate a minimum cost of £45 million and potentially a cost of up to £103 million. The consultant's argument is fair because apart from not requiring "traction power" most of the other per kilometre cost factors will still apply to an installation. Even the fact that the vehicles may cost a third or a half as much as normal light rail trams will not reduce the other infrastructure costs that much.
The report also looks at the costs of a bus rapid system. The buses would cost a total of £4 million and a route cost of £2.8 million per kilometre gives a total project cost of £24 million.
Referring back to table 4.8, it seems odd that such a low cost per kilometre can be achieved since surely the buses will need many of the same facilities as a rail based system. This would include site preparation, stops, signalling and telecommunications and highway works. This would give a cost per kilometre of £5.4 million and for the 7.2 km route a total cost of £39 million plus the £4 million for the buses themselves giving a grand total of £43 million. The fact that the bid placed this week sets the cost at £48 million, shows that the £24 million estimate in the original report was in fact an unrealistically low estimate (only 50% of the actual cost).
The report does not cost out a light rail solution explicitly but does look at tramtrains and lists the per kilometre costs of other UK tram systems which ranged from £6.46 million per kilometre to £23.50 million per kilometre with an average of £11.62 million per kilometre. Based on the tramtain estimate this would put the total cost of a light rail system between £110 million and £140 million.
In summary light rail would cost £110-140 million, ultra light rail would cost £45-103 million and bus rapid transit £48 million.
Transport schemes are funded in part by local authorities and in part by central government. Current central government policy is that it will fund up to 90% of bus based rapid transit systems but only 75% of rail based rapid transit systems.
That means that the local authority would only have to fund £4.3 million (10% of £43 million) for a bus rapid transit but would have to find £11-26 million (25% of £45-105 million) for an ultra light rail system or £27-35 million (25% of £110-140 million) for a light rail system.
To put that in perspective the total annual council budget is £353 million of which £20 million goes on transport.
Also consider that the city centre to Long Ashton rapid transit route is only the first of many to be added. The twenty year vision for the area includes rapid transit from the Bristol International Airport to Long Ashton, three routes in south Bristol, three routes in north Bristol, a link from the centre to Kingswood, another from central Bristol to central Bath, a north to south Bath route and an east to west Bath route.
In 2004 the then Transport Secretary Alistair Darling launched a white paper called the "Futher of Transport". In his press announcement he said:
Light rail can be very effective in persuading people to use public transport. Since 2000 new lines have opened in Croydon, Tyne and Wear, Manchester and Nottingham.
Manchester’s metro has been extremely successful. But plans for the extension have been dogged by successive cost increases. The central Government capital contribution rose from £282 million cash in 2000 to £520m cash in 2002, on top of which required annual central government payments have also risen from £5m a year in 2000 to £17m a year today - worth roughly another £150m.
There's a similar pattern with the Leeds and South Hampshire tram proposals. In Leeds the Present Value of the public sector contribution was capped at £355m, but is now estimated at £500 million. And in South Hampshire, the original £170m Present Value is now £100m more.
And in each case there's no certainty that costs won't rise further. The NAO was right to raise concerns; looking back over the last 20 years it has cost more to provide light rail here than elsewhere in Europe.
No Government could accept these schemes as they are on the basis of these cost escalations. We cannot therefore approve them. We need instead to look urgently at how light rail could be made affordable, including the best approach for procurement. We will work with local authorities on the development of schemes, building on the recent NAO recommendations.
He cancelled the Leeds supertram project and the government has more or less killed off the Merseytram project.
It was against this background in 2005 that the West of England Partnership produced the Greater Bristol Strategic Transport Study and the Joint Local Transport Plan. It was at this point buses became the only real candidate for a rapid transit system.
The fact that the West of England Partnership has revisited tramtrains and ultra light rail again recently is encouraging, but largely central government policy and funding restrictions mean there is little choice about how the rapid transit system can be delivered.